The argument in one screen
Compensation protects independence
Hamilton says power over subsistence is power over will, so judges need salary protection against political punishment.
Judicial pay can rise but not fall
The Constitution forbids diminishing judges' compensation during office while still allowing future upward adjustment if circumstances change.
Impeachment handles misconduct
Hamilton treats impeachment as the proper mechanism for judicial responsibility because it preserves independence while still punishing bad behavior.
Inability is a hard line to measure
He worries that vague removal standards for inability would invite abuse, speculation, and political manipulation.
Why Hamilton thinks judicial independence depends on pay as well as tenure
Federalist 78 defended life tenure during good behavior and the judiciary's role in a limited constitution. Federalist 79 continues by asking what institutional support makes that independence real in practice rather than rhetorical.
Hamilton's answer is blunt: if the legislature can reduce judges to financial insecurity, the legislature can pressure their conduct. That is why he treats compensation as the next great support of judicial independence after permanency in office.
Not a perks argument. A structural argument that the branch with neither sword nor purse must at least not live at the mercy of the political branches it may need to contradict.
“NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.”
Hamilton's hierarchy is explicit: tenure matters first, but protected pay comes immediately after it.
“In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”
This is Hamilton's psychological argument that salary pressure can become judicial pressure.
“The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments.”
Hamilton says accountability belongs in impeachment for misconduct, not in ordinary political dependence.
How Hamilton explains the compensation clause
He does not want judicial salaries frozen forever at a numerical level, because the value of money and the needs of office can change over a lifetime of service. What he wants instead is protection against diminution while a judge remains in office.
That is why Hamilton distinguishes judges from the President. Presidential compensation can neither be increased nor diminished during a term. Judicial compensation, by contrast, can be increased over time if circumstances require it, but cannot be reduced in a way that would punish or intimidate sitting judges.
His underlying principle is independence without absurd rigidity. The legislature may respond to long-term economic change, but it may not use the salary lever as a weapon against judicial duty.
He wants independence from occasional grants
Hamilton distrusts any arrangement where judges must effectively wait on legislative generosity to remain adequately supported.
He treats impeachment as compatible with independence
Misconduct can still be punished through the Constitution's impeachment process without turning judges into temporary officeholders.
He is skeptical of vague inability-removal schemes
Hamilton worries that trying to measure mental decline or diminished capacity through open-ended standards would invite abuse rather than clarity.
Federalist 79 matters because it shows Hamilton reasoning about judicial independence in practical, not merely theoretical, terms. A constitution can praise impartial judges all it wants; if their livelihood is politically vulnerable, their independence is vulnerable too.
It also matters because Hamilton is trying to hold two principles together at once. Courts must be independent enough to resist pressure, but they must also remain responsible for genuine misconduct. He thinks impeachment, not salary dependence, is the right constitutional answer to that problem.
Why Federalist 79 matters in the larger judiciary sequence
Federalist 78 defended judicial tenure and judicial review in a limited constitution. Federalist 79 asks what else judges need to remain independent once they are in office, and Hamilton's answer is secure compensation joined to impeachment-based responsibility.
The next essay, Federalist 80, moves from how judges are protected to what cases federal courts should hear at all — constitutional cases, national-law cases, interstate and foreign disputes, maritime causes, and other controversies affecting the peace of the Union. For the wider Publius frame, return to Who wrote the Federalist Papers?.
What to read next
Primary sources and further reading
- The Federalist No. 79 | Founders Online — Hamilton on judicial compensation, impeachment, and why legislative control of subsistence can threaten judicial independence.
Related essays by theme
Use Federalist 79 to see why Hamilton thinks an independent judiciary cannot live on political sufferance
This is the essay to read when you want Hamilton's practical answer to a hard constitutional question: how do you keep judges accountable for misconduct without letting the political branches make them financially dependent?
Hamilton's defense of judicial salaries and tenure still frames why an independent bench needs practical protection.